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Abstract
This paper presents a tentative outline for the construction of an ar-
tificial, generally intelligent system (AGI). It is argued that building a
general data compression algorithm solving all problems up to a complex-
ity threshold should be the main thrust of research. A measure for partial
progress in AGI is suggested. Although the details are far from being
clear, some general properties for a general compression algorithm are
fleshed out. Its inductive bias should be flexible and adapt to the input
data while constantly searching for a simple, orthogonal and complete set
of hypotheses explaining the data. It should recursively reduce the size
of its representations thereby compressing the data increasingly at every
iteration.
Based on that fundamental ability, a grounded reasoning system is
proposed. It is argued how grounding and flexible feature bases made of
hypotheses allow for resourceful thinking. While the simulation of repre-
sentation contents on the mental stage accounts for much of the power of
propositional logic, compression leads to simple sets of hypotheses that
allow the detection and verification of universally quantified statements.
Together, it is highlighted how general compression and grounded rea-
soning could account for the birth and growth of first concepts about the
world and the commonsense reasoning about them.
∗e-mail: franz@fias.uni-frankfurt.de
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Introduction
This position paper contains a collection of ideas that I have developed over
the last years concerning the creation of a system exhibiting artificial general
intelligence (AGI). Although I came up with them on my own, most if not all
are not new and spread all over the literature.
The notion “general” is to be emphasized here. Unfortunately, after early un-
successful attempts research in artificial intelligence (AI) has moved its focus on
solving narrowly defined problems and tasks, which became known as “narrow
AI” (Kurzweil, 2005): world level in chess, jeopardy, backgammon, self-driving
cars, talking personal assistants and a myriad of other commercial applications.
Although those are impressive achievements and the usefulness of such appli-
cations is beyond any doubt, a system that exhibits general intelligence seems
still to be far away.
After compiling a large set of definitions in the literature Legg and Hutter
(2007) came up with a definition of intelligence that is consistent with most
other attempts:
“Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of
environments.”
This is exactly, what narrow AI does not achieve: it is programmed for a
very specific well-defined set of environments. Any deviation from that narrow
set most probably leads to failure of the system.
Conversely, humans are usually able to solve all sorts of tasks in very diverse
environments. Moreover, neuroscientific evidence teaches us, that brains are
able to process data cross-modally, e.g. by transforming visual data to auditory
or tactile stimuli in sensory substitution devices. It is also known that in new-
born ferrets neurons in the auditory cortex adopt characteristics of visual cells,
if fed with stimuli from the visual pathway (Sur et al., 1988). Those observa-
tions point to the hypothesis that the human brain is a general processor of
quite diversely structured data.
This idea is, of course, not new and is around at least since Simon and
Newell’s General Problem Solver developed in 1957. Although the problem is
far from being solved practically, Hutter (2005) has developed a mathematical
formulation and theoretical solution to the universal AGI problem, called AIXI.
Even though AIXI is incomputable, a lot can be learned from the formulation
and general thrust of research. The basic idea is the following. An AGI agent
receives input data from its sensors and picks an action at every time step while
trying to maximized reward. All data can be expressed as a binary sequence.
In order to act successfully, sequences have to be predicted, which is achieved
through Solomonoff’s universal theory of induction. Solomonoff derived an op-
timal way of predicting future data, given previous observations, provided the
data is sampled from a computable probability distribution. In a nutshell, Hut-
ter defines AIXI by espousing the Bellman equation of reinforcement learning
to Solomonoff’s sequence prediction.
Solomonoff (1964, 1978) has defined his famous universal prior that assigns
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a prior probability (a semimeasure to be precise) to every sequence,
M(x) ≡
∑
p:U(p)=x
2−|p|
where the sum is over all halting programs p of length |p| for which the universal
prefix Turing machine U outputs the sequence x. The universal prior exhibits an
Occam bias: by far the most probability mass is captured by short explanations
(programs) for an observation x. Impressively, Solomonoff has proved that this
prior correctly predicts any computable sequence: M(xt|x1, . . . , xt−1) → 1 as
t→∞, where xi denotes the ith sequence entry. In essence, we learn that if we
are able to find short programs for arbitrary sequences the problem of universal
inference is provably solved. Intuitively, the scientific method itself is about the
search of simple (short) explanations of phenomena. Arguably, it is a formal
and institutionalized reasoning method, but people, even infants, seem use it
in more simple everyday situations (Gopnik et al., 1999). If understanding the
world means to compress sensory data, we need a general data compressor.
Unfortunately, Solomonoff induction is not computable. Therefore, Hut-
ter and colleagues have developed approximations to AIXI, e.g. a Monte-Carlo
approximation that uses prediction suffix trees that enable predicting binary
D-order Markov sequences (Veness et al., 2011). This is an impressive achieve-
ment leading to a single system being able to play various games (Pac-Man,
Kuhn poker, TicTacToe, biased rock-paper-scissors, 1d-maze, cheese maze, tiger
and extended tiger) without having specifically been programmed for them –
a notable step towards generality of AI. In spite of that, it seems question-
able whether this approximation can be extended any further beyond Markov
sequences, since a well-known computational problem awaits: the curse of di-
mensionality. We will come back to that later.
It may seem not intuitive that data compression plus reinforcement learning
can lead to the solution of such diverse and non-trivial tasks. Traditionally, one
may suspect that various cognitive processes must be involved in the solution
of such tasks. Hutter shows how data compression implicitly incorporates those
processes. It may be objected that simple deep search of a chess program also
replaces all sorts of reasoning processes that presumably go on inside a human
chess player’s brain. However, AIXI is not a short-cut narrow-AI-like solution,
but provably a genuinely general approach. This has convinced me that general
data compression is the way to go if we head for general intelligence.
1 Approaching general data compression
1.1 Simple but general
1.1.1 Simplicity of tasks
Given the form of the universal prior one may consider universal search. For
example, Levin search executes all possible programs, starting with the shortest,
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Figure 1.1: Approach to artificial general intelligence. Instead of trying to solve
complex but narrow tasks, AGI research should head for solving all simple tasks
and only then expand toward more complexity.
until one of them generates the required sequence. Although general, it is not
surprising that it is a computationally costly approach and rarely applicable in
practice.
On the other side of the spectrum, we have non-general but computationally
tractable approaches: common AI algorithms and machine learning techniques.
Why could they not be generalized? The problem that all those techniques
face at some point is known as the curse of dimensionality. Considering the
(algorithmic) complexity and diversity of tasks solved by typical today’s algo-
rithms, we observe that most if not all will be highly specific and many will
be able to solve quite complex tasks (Fig. 1.1). Algorithms from the field of
data compression are no exception. For example, the celebrated Lempel-Ziv
compression algorithm (see e.g. Cover and Thomas, 2012) handles stationary
sequences but fails at compressing a simple non-stationary sequence efficiently.
AI algorithms undoubtedly exhibit some intelligence, but when comparing them
to humans, a striking difference comes to mind: the tasks solvable by humans
seem to be much less complex albeit very diverse. After all, it is very hard for
humans to perform depth search in chess 10 moves ahead or learn the transition
probabilities of a variable-order stochastic Markov process, while they can do
both to some extent. For example, fitting the latter is performed by Hutter’s
Monte-Carlo AIXI approximation. Although Hutter has found a general, but in-
computable solution to the AGI problem, in the Monte-Carlo approximation he
uses again a narrow-AI-like approach. Others try to fill the task space by “glu-
ing together” various narrow algorithms that would, hopefully, synergistically
cancel each other’s combinatorial explosions (Goertzel, 2009).
In a nutshell, I suggest that we should not try to beat the curse of dimension-
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ality mercilessly awaiting us at high complexities, but instead head for general
algorithms at low complexity levels and fill the task cup from the bottom up.
1.1.2 Simplicity of the algorithm
Given that I have set the goal to compress general but simple data sets, the
question arises whether the algorithm that performs that task can expected to
be complex or rather simple as well. From the point of view of “narrow AI”
the programmer has to anticipate exhaustively all data situations that his algo-
rithm could possibly be exposed to, which would otherwise lead to bugs. Such
an approach naturally leads to very complex and still not general algorithms.
However, as mentioned earlier, it is the very hallmark of generality that the
algorithm itself is required to be able to deal with the whole variability of data
situations. Does it mean that the general AI algorithm could actually be quite
simple itself?
A biological argument points in that direction (Berglas, 2008). Human in-
telligence must ultimately be encoded in the DNA. The human DNA consists of
only 3 billion base pairs. Since there are four bases (A, C, T and G), one base
carries the information of 2 bits. Therefore, the amount of information encoded
in the DNA is merely 3 · 109 · 2/8/10242 = 715 megabytes. It fits on a single
Compact Disk and is much smaller than substantial pieces of non-intelligent
software such as Microsoft Vista, Office, or the Oracle database.
“Further”, Berglas writes, “only about 1.5% of the DNA actually encodes
genes [although it is currently debated whether the rest is just redundant repet-
itive junk]. Of the gene producing portions of DNA, only a small proportion
appears to have anything to do with intelligence (say 10%). The difference be-
tween Chimpanzee DNA and man is only about 1% of gene encoding regions,
5% non-gene. Much of this can be attributed to non-intelligent related issues
such as the quickly changing immune system and human’s very weak sense of
smell. So the difference in the “software” between humans and chimpanzees
might be as little as 715 · 10% · 1.5% · 1% =11 kilobytes of real data.” Of course,
we are dealing with a quite compact representation and Berglas may be wrong
about one or two orders of magnitude, but hardly more. “In computer software
terms even 1.0 megabytes is tiny.”
I therefore conclude that the algorithm for general intelligence, at least as
general as human intelligence, must be simple compared to modern software.
We are facing a software problem, not a memory problem.
1.2 A measure for partial progress in AGI
One of the troubles of AGI research is the lack of a measure for partial progress.
While the Turing test is widely accepted as a test for general intelligence, it
is only able to give an all or none signal. In spite of all attempts, we did not
yet have a way to tell whether we are half way or 10% through towards general
intelligence.
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The reason for that disorientation is the fact that every algorithm that
achieved part of what we may call intelligent behavior, has failed to gener-
alize to a wider range of behaviors. Therefore, we could not tell whether we
have made some progress in the right direction or whether we have been on the
wrong track all along. As Dreyfus (1992) cynically remarks, progress in AI is
like the man who tries to get to the moon by climbing a tree: “one can report
steady progress, all the way to the top of the tree”. Since dead ends have been
ubiquitous there has been growing skepticism in the AI community.
However, since Hutter (2005) has mathematically solved the AGI problem
(!), and the core part to be made tractable is the compression part, we can for-
malize partial progress toward AGI as the extent to which general compression
has been achieved.
As I argued in ch. 1.1, if we start out with a provably general algorithm that
works up to a complexity level, thereby solving all simple compression problems,
the objection about its possible non-generalizability is countered. The measure
for partial progress then simply becomes the complexity level up to which the
algorithm can solve all problems. Here, I will try to formalize that measure.
Suppose, we run binary programs on a universal prefix Turing machine U .
U ’s possible input programs pi can be ordered in a length-increasing lexico-
graphic way: “” (empty program), “0”, “1”, “00”, “01”, “10”, “11”, “000”, etc. up
to a maximal complexity level L. We run all those programs until they halt
or for a maximum of t time steps and read off their outputs xi on the output
tape. In contrast to Kolmogorov complexity1, we use the time-bounded version
– the Levin complexity – which is computable and includes a penalty term on
computation time (Li and Vitányi, 2009):
Kt(x) = min
p
{|p|+ log t : U(p) = x in t steps}
Saving all the generated strings paired with their optimal programs (xi, poi ) with
poi = {p : Kt(xi) = |p| + log t, |p| ≤ L}, we have all we need for the progress
measure. The goal of the general compressor is to find all such optimal programs
poi for each of the xi. If p is the actual program found by the compressor, its
performance can be measured by
ri(L) =
|xi| − |p|
|xi| − |poi |
∈ [0, 1]
if the current string x is among the {xi}. If not, there is no time-bounded
solution to the compression problem. The overall performance R at complexity
level L could be used as a measure for partial progress in general compression
and be given by averaging: R(L) = 〈ri(L)〉. For example, one could start with
a small L until R approaches 1 and increase L gradually as suggested by Fig.
1.1.
One may object that the number of programs increases exponentially with
their length such that an enumeration quickly becomes intractable. This is
1The Kolmogorov complexity of a string is defined as the length of the shortest program
able to generate that string on a Turing machine.
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a weighty argument if the task is universal search – a general procedure for
inversion problems. However, I suggest this procedure to play the mere role
of a test case for an efficient general compression algorithm, which will use
completely different methods than universal search and the properties of which
shall be outlined in ch. 2. Therefore, using the set of simple programs as a test
case may be enough to set the general compression algorithm on the right track.
If the limit complexity of what is tractable today is Ltoday, then I doubt that
there exists an algorithm that is able to compress all sequences x that can be
generated by a program p with |p| ≤ Ltoday. It will be a matter of future tests
to find out.
1.3 How many sequences are constructively compressible?
It is well known in the theory of Kolmogorov complexity that most strings cannot
be compressed; more precisely, only exponentially few O(2n−m) binary strings
of length n can be compressed by m bits (see e.g. Sipser, 2012). Interestingly,
the number of predictable sequences are also tightly bounded by an expression
of the same order of magnitude Θ(2n−m) (Kalnishkan et al., 2003). This proven
fact strengthens the intuition that understanding and therefore predicting the
world is about compressing sensory data.
Since we can not compress most sequences, it suffices to find programs for
that small fraction of compressible sequences. Further, we have to be aware
that an optimal algorithm that compresses all compressible sequences may not
exist. After all, it is not clear whether all information needed to infer the short-
est program is present in the sequence itself or whether additional knowledge
is required. For example, the first few digits of pi (3, 1, 4, 1, 5, 9, 2, 6, 5, 3, . . .)
may not contain enough information to infer pi, they rather follow only after
the discovery of additional knowledge about trigonometric functions and their
properties.
In summary, we are heading for an algorithm that infers short programs
generating most compressible sequences. The algorithm should be general from
the start, i.e. be able to find most if not all sequences below a complexity
threshold.
2 Properties of the general compressor
Conventionally, when designing an algorithm, one is implicitly forced to make a
choice: either the algorithm is endowed with a strong inductive bias towards a
specific narrow class of data (e.g. linear regression), which requires careful prepa-
ration of data and checking the requirements of the algorithm (e.g. normality
of distributions), or one uses structures that can process broad classes of data,
such as neural networks, but leads to the curse of dimensionality. The former
leads to efficient inference but breaks down if the data is not in the appropriate
format. The latter is widely applicable but the struggle is with low convergence
rates, local minima or overfitting. In both cases careful tuning is required by
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the programmer. Christoph von der Malsburg2 diagnosed this situation quite
cynically by saying that most of the final algorithm’s intelligence resides not in
the algorithm itself but in the programmer’s intelligent tuning.
2.1 Data-dependent search space expansion
How shall we solve that dilemma? My suggestion is that the inductive bias
should change dynamically as data arrives.
To illustrate the idea, consider the following sequence:
1, 3, 1, 3, 2, 4, 2, 4, 2, 3, 5, 3, 5, 3, 5, 4, 6, 4, 6, 4, 6, 4,
1, 4, 1, 4, 2, 5, 2, 5, 2, 3, 6, 3, 6, 3, 6, 4, 7, 4, 7, 4, 7, 4, ...
The first 4 digits may indicate that the sequence alternates between 1 and 3.
This hypothesis is then expanded as a new alternation is discovered subsequently
between 2 and 4. This may lead to the hypothesis that we are dealing with
blocks of alternation subsequences. The next block alternates 3 and 5 and we
discover that each block is longer by 1 element than the previous block, while
the starting number is also increasing from 1 to 2 to 3 and so on, while the
difference between alternating numbers is always 2. This hypothesis is changed
again when 1 and 4 start to alternate, hence it looks like the starting number
and block length has been reset and the difference is increased to 3.
In fact a quite simple program can be written to generate that sequence. But
how could it be inferred? Humans obviously can do this. We notice that the
inductive bias and the corresponding search space is increasingly expanded in
directions dictated by the data itself. First, alternation can be parametrized by
two numbers – a small search space quickly instantiated with 1 and 3. Then it is
expanded to represent blocks of subsequences containing alternating sequences.
Then, not two numbers are saved, but the starting one and the difference (equal
to 2 then to 3) are saved. And finally the simplest parametrized representation
that contains the present sequence is found: blocks of alternating sequences of
variable differences and block lengths.
Conventionally, one would either preprogram this parametrization and learn-
ing would simply consist of finding the parameters. Or one would define a large
search space of programs containing the correct one and end up being lost in the
search space. In contrast to that, I suggest starting with a small search space
and expand it in directions imposed by the actual data.
Of course, I am not the only one who thought about this problem. An inter-
esting piece of work comes from the Bayes community. Kemp and Tenenbaum
(2008) present an algorithm using hierarchical Bayesian inference in order to
“discover structural form”, e.g. given feature vectors of animal properties infer-
ring that they should be arranged on a (evolutionary) tree rather than on a
chain, circle or grid. The interesting property is that learning is reasonably fast
given a quite large search space. After all, the structural forms are not given a
priori. Thus, an interplay between several Bayesian hierarchies happens. First,
a piece of data comes in and produces a slight bias towards one of the struc-
2Personal communication
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tures. Then, this slight inductive bias toward some of the structures is used to
categorize new data more efficiently, which leads to an even faster formation
of bias toward a structure. Hence, we see here a nice example of a flexible in-
ductive bias. The downside is though that the overall large space of structures
has to be defined, in this case by a graph grammar generating the structures.
Consequently, the whole big search space is still given a priori, learning is mere
selection of one of the hypotheses in the large space; just inference is made in
clever way. In contrast to that, I suggest to refrain from defining the search
space of the algorithm before data arrives.
Actually, this insight should be obvious. After all, the scientific method does
not prespecify all possible theories that could explain all possible worlds before
starting to observe the world experimentally. Instead, when new data comes
in, scientists try to find a set of simple explanations consistent with it and all
previous data. In computer science terms, a large search space is traversed
efficiently by ruling out large subspaces inconsistent with data. Solutions of
considerable complexity can be found that way, just think of modern theories
in physics.
Our line of reasoning suggests to the following iterative approach.
1. Look at a sufficiently small piece of data.
2. Construct a set of as simple as possible hypotheses consistent with it – a
small search space.
3. Look at the next piece of data and compute the likelihoods and posteriors
of the hypotheses.
4. Expand the search space around the most likely hypotheses, e.g. find gen-
eralizations or supersets of the most likely hypotheses. Discard the un-
likely ones.
5. Go to 3 until the posterior probability of a hypothesis is large enough.
2.2 Features and hypothesis sequences
The crucial question becomes how to construct the set of simplest hypotheses
consistent with the sequence part seen so far. If we solve this problem for
arbitrary sequences, I suspect that the most difficult task for a general data
compressor will be solved.
For example, consider a sequence, starting with 1, 3, . . . Suppose one con-
siders the null hypothesis that it is a deterministic first-order Markov sequence
using addition. Then, the only unknown is the summand which can be fit-
ted to be 2 – a small search space –, and the sequence can be continued to
1, 3, 5, 7, 9, . . . There are several ways the null hypothesis can be expanded: it
can be questioned in three possible ways. The sequence could be
• indeterministic,
• higher-order Markov or non-Markovian at all, or
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• using a different arithmetic function or an arbitrary function,
or a combination of any of them. It seems to be a general observation that the
definition of a hypothesis consists of features (here determinism, Markovian-
ity and the applied function) that can be questioned systematically and from
which new hypotheses can be derived. The null hypothesis is a specification of
the search space, the inductive bias, within which a search algorithm has to find
a solution. The “narrow AI” approach is marked by the fact that such specifi-
cations are provided by a human programmer after a careful prior examination
of the data set. Only the remaining “blind” search is performed by the algo-
rithm, which is then proudly announced to be “intelligent” (McDermott, 1976).
If we want to depart from such practices, we have to find an algorithmic way to
question those specifications and corresponding underlying assumptions.
For example, a higher order Markov process can be described by taking data
from n previous entries implying position offsets described by the family of sets
{−1,−2, . . . ,−n} parametrized by n. Searching for a solution in this subspace
is what I call expanding the hypothesis in the direction of the feature. Expanding
in the direction of Markovianity thus leads to a sequence of possible alternative
hypotheses, ordered after complexity: 2nd, 3rd,... , n-th order Markov processes.
This ordered set of alternative hypotheses in the direction of a particular feature
is what I call hypothesis sequence.
Overall, it seems that features act as a “basis” and elements of a hypothesis
sequence act like “coordinates”. Specifying the value of each feature leads to a
sufficient specification of the problem for a search algorithm to solve it. The
metaphor of a feature basis will prove useful, as we will see later, and hopefully
could move beyond a metaphor and acquire a precise mathematical meaning at
some point.
2.3 Measuring progress: the compression rate
Compressing data means finding a representation of it that takes less memory.
In our case, we want to infer programs that generate a sequence. Consider
the finite string with length 16: 0001111100000000. Assuming it to be defined
on the domain {0, 1} and each entry drawn from it with probability p = 0.5,
then its entropy is H0 = −16 log2(p) = 16 bits. It takes 16 bits of memory
to store it. Suppose, we have inferred a parametric program that represents
“start at position n and write l ones, all others are zero”. As n and l can
range between 1 and 16, each of them requires Hpars = log2 16 = 4 bits to be
specified. Additionally the program itself requires memory Hprog. The goal is
to maximize the compression rate
1− Hprog +Hpars
H0
each time a new representation is found.
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2.4 Recursiveness
Suppose, such blocks of ones occur 10 times in a string of length 1024. Then
specifying all starting positions and lengths takes H(1)pars = 2 · 10 · log2(1024) =
200 bits. Neglecting the size of the program it corresponds to a considerable
compression rate of 1−200/1024 = 80.4%. But suppose we discover a regularity
in the starting positions and lengths, say ni = 100 · i and li = 4. Then only one
length has to be specified and the step size (100), which takes only H(2)pars = 20
bits and pushes the overall compression rate to 1 − 20/1024 = 98%. In this
fashion, data can be compressed recursively in the sense that the same data
compression machinery is first applied to the data itself and then recursively
to the parameters of the models. Here we notice the need for the generality
of the data compressor: after all, we had a single binary sequence at first and
then two integer sequences for the starting positions and lengths, respectively.
A recursion level should be accepted if compression is increased. Recursive data
compression can reach arbitrary high levels until no more compressive model is
found. A great example in science is the quest for unification in physics: the
standard model of particle physics is left with only 19 parameters to be explained
in a grand unified theory. In contrast to this, AI algorithms usually do not
possess additional compression levels, except in the small field of metacognition
research (Cox, 2005). But even there compression is not recursive, i.e. different
algorithms are used at meta-levels, except some notable examples from Marvin
Minsky’s group (Singh, 2005; Morgan, 2013). If we want to build a general
compressor though, there is no way we can foresee which type of algorithm is
needed for which data set and at which level: the compressor has to be general
enough to handle them all.
2.5 Orthogonality of the feature basis
In ch. 2.2 we gave an example of three features. Those features are orthogonal
in the sense that the specification of each of them does not contain information
about any of the others. Markovianity does not bear on determinism of the
applied function, nor does (in)determinism specify dependence structures or
the applied function etc. Formally, the pairwise mutual information between all
features should be zero. We should aim to find an orthogonal feature basis for the
description of a data set since otherwise features share information and lead to
redundancy in the representations, which implies a lower total compression rate.
Orthogonality also specifies the search procedure. Suppose we have answered
the question about the dependence structure and found out that the current
sequence entry only depends on the previous one. Then all remaining questions
boil down to describing that dependence and can be tackled independently. In
other words, only orthogonal features need to be considered.
In summary, our compression algorithm can be characterized as follows.
First, it has to find an orthogonal feature basis and expand in the direction
of those features. Then the likelihood of each hypothesis in the space spanned
by the feature basis can be computed. Then the hypothesis with the largest
12
posterior probability can be expanded further etc. while we look at more and
more data. We should use the posterior instead of the likelihood since the
Bayes theorem automatically takes care of Occam’s razor – the trade off between
explanatory power of a model and its complexity (see chapter “Model comparison
and Occam’s Razor” in MacKay, 2003). In parallel, since the feature basis is
parametrized, the residual entropy in the parameters should be compressed
further in higher recursion levels leading to increasingly simpler and powerful
models.
2.6 Extracting orthogonal features
After establishing orthogonality the search space for a feature basis is severely
reduced. Nevertheless, features have to be extracted somehow. In Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) at each step a vector is first defined pointing to
the direction of largest variance and then the data cloud is projected onto the
surface perpendicular to that vector such that the variance in its direction is
nullified. Subsequently, only the residual variance in perpendicular directions
is considered such that ultimately an orthogonal basis is found ordered after
the variance “explained” by the vectors. Analogously, orthogonal features can
be extracted when focusing on the residual variance of the data. For example,
consider a point B lying exactly in the middle between two other points, A
and C. Suppose the features “distance” and “angle” are available to the system.
First, the system would notice that the distances A-B and B-C are equal and
thereby discover the equidistancy feature, since two equal distances leads to
compression (see ch. 4.1). This feature may be viewed as the first “principal
component”. Then, images can be sampled holding the equidistancy feature
active, which results in random isosceles triangles. Subsequently, the residual
variance is found in the angle feature which is 180° (or pi) – again a compressible
number – in the case of B lying in the middle between A and C. This leads to the
discovery of the “between” feature. In this way, the situation “B is in the middle
between A and C” can be described in a complete and orthogonal feature basis:
middle = equidistant and between. The basis is orthogonal, because angles and
distances can be changed independently of each other. It is complete, because
constraining a point to be in equal distance to two other points while lying at
the same time between them, necessarily produces instances of the “middle”
situation.
Even though the requirement of an orthogonal and complete basis and a
PCA-like procedure for its search greatly reduces the search space for features,
it is not clear enough to me how to find features in arbitrary data situations and
constitutes one of the frontiers for future research. A crucial, feature defining
step seems to be the ability to realize that the current data situation is a special
case of a general one. After all, as I argued in ch. 2.1, the general description
must not (and can not) be given a priori.
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2.7 Interpretation rivalry
Someone said that the idea of splitting the AI field in a multitude of subfields
has marked the beginning of the failure of the whole field. After all, perception
requires reasoning, reasoning requires learning, learning has to rely on planning
an vice versa – all subfields are actually densely interconnected in the human
mind. Hence, the attempt to solve them separately from the others may have
slowed down the progress in general AI.
For example, image segmentation in computer vision suffers from the prob-
lem that our ability to segment an image into separate objects and their parts
heavily depends on our knowledge about the objects. As I will argue in ch. 4.1,
the conceptualization of objects is driven by compression. Therefore, an image
or sequence, should be segmented in such a way that compression is maximized.
I suggest that a sequence should be segmented in those cases when all segments
are highly compressible while the whole sequence can not be easily compressed.
For example, piecewise constant sequences: 15, 15, 15, 15, 32, 32, 32, 32, 32,
32, 7, 7, 7, 7. Implicitly, it was assumed here, that the segmentation consists
in finding a partition of the position set {1, . . . , 14} into intervals, and not an
arbitrary partition. This bias can again be explained by the recursiveness of
general compression: intervals can be described simply by two numbers while
the description of a generic subset would have to enumerate all positions that
it consists of.
In essence, the problem consists of finding an assignment of every data point
to a subset of the partition. Like in multistable perception images where the
same image can be interpreted in several ways, one can frame the problem as a
rivalry for different interpretations of the same image, while trying to maximize
compression. The problem is reminiscent of the famous Ising model in which
the spins of a hot ferromagnet are first oriented randomly, but increasingly form
islands of equally oriented spins as the temperature decreases. This behavior
is explained by a high energy that is required to keep neighboring spins in
opposite directions. Similarly, a perceptual scene should naturally break up
into segments/objects when trying to maximize compression.
3 Grounded reasoning
Although general data compression seems to be a central ingredient for AGI,
several other important issues like language, memory, reasoning, commonsense
knowledge, resourcefulness, brittleness and many others keep staring at the
researcher intimidatingly. In the following, far from claiming to have solved
anything, I will introduce my ideas about some of them and highlight the way,
general data compression bears on them.
Suppose, general compression works. What then? One of the most burn-
ing questions in AI is the problem that AI systems do not really know anything
about the world, commonsense knowledge possessed by any 3-year-old. As Mar-
vin Minksy has put it, “no program today can look around a room and then
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identify the things that meet its eyes” (Minsky, 2011). The problem is not just
about identification but about being able to understand and describe the objects
and knowing about their function.
In this section, I will argue why grounded reasoning is an important step
towards commonsense reasoning an thereby towards AGI and how it densely
and naturally interacts with general compression.
3.1 What is grounding?
In his seminal paper, Harnad (1990) addresses the so-called symbol grounding
problem – a symptom of a disease of purely symbolic AI systems:
“How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be made
intrinsic to the system, rather than just parasitic on the meanings in our heads?
How can the meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, manipulated solely
on the basis of their (arbitrary) shapes, be grounded in anything but other
meaningless symbols?”
I suggest to split the problem into two subproblems. The first is a philosoph-
ical problem called intentionality: how can symbols or any representations for
that matter re-present anything about the world? Where is the invisible arrow
pointing from the symbol DOG to the real dog? And how can the symbol DOG
ever express the ineffable meaning of a real dog? Based on such questions, there
is a huge philosophical discussion about whether computers could ever think
(see e.g. Dreyfus, 1992); after all, computers only juggle the symbols “0” and “1”
around, without ever being able to know what anything truly means. I shall not
dive into this discussion, but merely state that representations are not meant to
possess any intentionality, there is no arrow, but merely a mechanical reaction to
external stimuli. The “grandmother neuron” simply reacts to the occurrence of
the grandmother in the visual field, it does not point to the grandmother in any
way, nor does it “know” about the grandmother in any deeper epistemological
sense.
The second subproblem is more important though. I define a system as
grounded if it is able to form representations at arbitrary granularity. Imagine
several feature bases of a square (Fig. 3.1). It is easy to see, that four features
are enough to specify the square, that is to form a complete, orthogonal basis
for it. But the basis is not unique, Fig. 3.1a is just as good as 3.1b. Further, a
basis can be formed from line segments as in Figs. 3.1c and 3.1d. However, it is
the hallmark of features to represent an aspect of the stimulus while dismissing
other information. Once the line feature is represented, it can only be changed
by its parameters (end point coordinates), but not cut into pieces as in 3.1d.
One the feature base in 3.1a is chosen, changing α leads to a rotation around
the corner, but not, say, around the mid point of the square. The point is,
once a feature basis of an object is chosen, the representation becomes atomic,
such that the ability to form more fine-grained representations is lost. The only
way to split the atoms is to go back to the low level input, either to the actual
square stimulating the systems sensors or to generate an imagined square from
the complete feature basis. Only then a new, more fine-grained feature basis can
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be extracted, since only the low level input stimulus, presented to the system
point by point, contains enough information to accomplish that task.
It may be interjected that it is exactly those variably fine-grained represen-
tations that hierarchical network approaches such as DeSTIN (Arel et al., 2009)
or Hawkins’ Hierarchical Temporal Memories (Hawkins and Blakeslee, 2007)
develop at each of their levels. However, I see at least three problems associated
with them. First, nodes at each level look at a specific, hard-wired patch of
child nodes at the level below. Thus, a hierarchical segmentation of the image
is essentially hard-wired and fails to fulfill the requirement of a data-dependent
inductive bias (ch. 2.1). Second, such hierarchies are designed for finding parto-
nomic stimulus decompositions, while failing to find other representations (e.g.
taxonomies). Finally, the representations can not be transformed, thus inhibit-
ing resourceful thinking. The latter point is so important that the next subsec-
tion will be devoted to it. Nevertheless, hierarchical representations may well be
the right solution, but their flexibility has to increase significantly, probably to
obtain the same expressive power as the hierarchies of program trees in general.
Consider further the procedure in ch. 2.6. Assume a function that estab-
lishes whether a point is in the middle between two others has been hard-
coded, making it impossible for the system to analyze it further. However,
remarkably, this PCA-like procedure allows for the decomposition of a seem-
ingly atomic/symbolic concept “middle” into its components “equidistant” and
“between”. A grounded system is able to dissolve a concept such as a “grand-
mother” into its conceptual components (e.g. body parts), the components re-
cursively into their own components etc. down to the raw input image. It is
thus the interaction between the concept and the low level input that allows for
an analysis of variable granularity.
As we shall see, grounding will set the foundation for non-symbolic, context
dependent reasoning and resourceful thinking.
3.2 Resourcefulness
Intelligent problem solving requires the ability to think in different ways about
the problem, which Minsky coined as resourcefulness (Minsky, 2006). The re-
search in the phenomenon of “insight” in thought psychology constitutes a well
presentation of this issue. For example, in Karl Duncker’s famous “candle prob-
lem” the subject is asked to fix a lit candle on a wall (a cork board) in a way
so the candle wax won’t drip onto the table below. To do so, the subject is
provided a book of matches and a box of thumbtacks. Usually, subjects have
difficulties to solve the problem until it dawns on them that the box containing
the thumbtacks, can be tacked to the wall and serve as holder of the candle.
Hence, humans have got the ability to think of a box sometimes as a container
and sometimes as a supporting device.
In the so-called mutilated chessboard problem (Kaplan and Simon, 1990),
the two diagonally opposing corners of the 8 x 8 board are cut out. The subject
is required to either cover this mutilated chessboard with domino pieces, each
covering two squares, such that all 62 squares are fully covered, or to prove that
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Figure 3.1: Possible feature bases representing a particular square.
the task is insoluble. Usually, after trying various coverings subjects experience
an “aha” moment realizing that the two missing corners are of the same color, say
white. Therefore, there are two more black squares than white squares. Since
each domino piece covers one black and one white square, there will always be
two black squares left after each covering of the board. And since two black
squares are never adjacent on a chessboard, the task is insoluble.
The reason for the present discussion is that in such cases subjects need to
switch to a different “representation space” (Kaplan and Simon, 1990) of the
problem – a different feature basis in our terminology – in order to solve it.
First, the search space is spanned by the combinations of positions of domino
pieces. Only after attending to the color feature of the chessboard and spanning
the search space by the colors and numbers of squares, the problem can be solved
efficiently. Only after switching from the containing to the supporting feature
of the thumbtack box, the solution of the candle problem comes to mind.
As it was discussed in ch. 3.1, a square can be represented in different ways.
A intelligent system has to be able to both understand that fact and to switch
between various representations in order to be resourceful.
Resourcefulness poses by itself a strong argument against “narrow AI”: if the
representation of the problem is chosen a priori there is no way the system could
change it. Whether the representation is symbolic or subsymbolic in nature, it
intrinsically introduces a fixed induction bias to the system. As I have argued
in ch. 2.1, in spite of being important and necessary the induction bias must be
changeable in a flexible way.
This realization begs the question whether it is possible to find an algorithm
for the transformation between features bases. Is there a general way to detect
appropriate transformations, rotations in search space, so to speak? What con-
17
nects two representations of the same data? Can such changes in representation
can generally be achieved without going back to the input itself?
I suspect that the answer is negative; after all only the low level input con-
tains all the information necessary to construct arbitrary representations. A
plausible way to switch representations is to take the current one, generate a
data sample from it (simulate it on the “mental stage”) and look for a different
feature basis to represent it again. For example, one should take a definition
(a generative model) of a square, sample a particular square from it, observe
some other features of it and span a different feature basis, which constitutes
a different definition of the same figure. Without the input, there is no way to
“cut through” the existing symbols; neither transformations into different fea-
ture bases seem possible without a severe task-specific formalization effort, nor
are representations of variable granularity possible.
Therefore, resourceful thinking is only possible if any construction of the
system’s symbols must be performed via the input. Otherwise, it is either
not possible to transform representations or – as it happens in formal logic
– transformations decouple the symbols from the world/input, leaving them
ungrounded, “dangling in the air” and independent of context.
In a nutshell, not only should the search for the right hypothesis describing
the data depend on the data itself, but also the resourcefulness of thinking – the
ability to represent the data in different ways – should be tightly tied to the data
itself. As such, resourcefulness constitutes another argument for grounding.
3.3 Formal logic for commonsense?
The AI community has been aware of the commonsense problem for quite a
while, but tackled it with limited success, unfortunately (Mueller, 2010). I
suggest that the main reason for it is the lack of grounding of representations.
The grounding of representations has been neglected for quite a while al-
though there have been calls for it (Harnad, 1990; Barsalou, 1999). Originally,
the call was for grounding of symbols, since it is with symbols that reasoning
has been represented, through usage of formal logic mostly.
Consider a commonsense problem, such using a string to tie a plant to a
rod, that is stuck into the ground. The prevalent method in the commonsense
reasoning community is to formalize the problem, such that all sorts of valid
statements can be logically concluded from the formal logical system. The idea
is to hand code abstracted relations between entities of the situation, add some
arguably general properties of space and time, and then being able to express
all other relationships in the situation basically through combinations of those
abstractions, e.g. by forward chaining through the formal knowledge base.
There are several problems with such an approach. First, in practice, com-
monsense situations are very difficult to formalize and arguably the formaliza-
tion process has to be done for each situation separately unless one has for-
malized the whole world somehow. Of course, this is exactly the ambition of
projects like Cyc which try to do that since 1985 (Lenat, 1995). Difficulty is
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not a formal argument of course, but we have to ask ourselves whether we are
on the right path with such an approach.
Second, being ungrounded means having to carry the structure of a real
world situation into one’s system which bears a practical danger that the hand
coded or concluded relations between entities will not hold as the system is
scaled up (Bach, 2009). There is no guarantee that the encoded relations are
actually the correct abstractions from the world situations.
Third, ungrounded representations have difficulties reacting to new situa-
tions where a new context leads to different conclusions.
Therefore, I suggest a simulation theory approach, much along the lines of
Barsalou (1999), that keeps a tight connection to the world while being able to
reason about it, as I will argue in the subsequent chapters.
3.4 The world as its own model: reasoning without formal
logic
Up to now, we have mostly talked about representations and how to switch be-
tween them, but not how to reason about properties and relations in a grounded
way.
Consider dropping a perpendicular from a corner of an isosceles triangle onto
the base. Then we will land exactly in the middle of the base. That sort of task
is quite easy to formalize and a formal proof that this is true for all isosceles tri-
angles can be derived. On the other hand, consider the approach of a grounded
mental simulation, which is arguably the way, humans solve the task (Barsa-
lou, 1999). From a representation of an isosceles triangle a particular sample
triangle is drawn onto the mental stage. Then, the perpendicular is dropped
that happens to land in the middle of the basis, a fact that can be read off from
the mental stage using appropriate features. The main difference between the
ungrounded and the grounded approach is that the former tries to arrive at
conclusions through proofs, that is by transforming one’s own representations,
while the latter samples a particular situation top-down onto the mental stage,
imposes the appropriate conditions and then reads off the result though bottom
up activation of features. This is the kind of grounded reasoning employed by
simulation theories.
Note that this sampling procedure implicitly computes a sort of modus po-
nens as in propositional logic. Given an isosceles triangle, it follows that the
perpendicular onto the base will split it in half. Interestingly, only the premise –
the presentation of a particular isosceles triangle in the simulation space/mental
stage – is provided by the system. The implication clause itself is not repre-
sented anywhere in the system and still the conclusion can be measured from the
mental stage. However, the implication clause is necessary for modus ponens to
work. Where is it then?
It must be in the world itself then. I suspect that it is the structure of
the world that implicitly “represents” by far the most knowledge. Either by
perceiving the world, or by connecting with it by mental simulation, it seems
possible to get access to that knowledge. In essence, it is not by hand coding
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or self-organized learning of large knowledge bases, but by letting the world
itself “represent” the large part of our knowledge, the commonsense knowledge
problem could be solved. Although this claim parallels Dreyfus’ (1992) call for
Heideggerian AI, I do not share his rejection of representations per se: we do
need representations in our systems, but they shall be grounded in the world
and the world’s intrinsic structure should be used for reasoning. Also, it is not
the magic touch of reality that is sometimes suspected behind the successes
of today’s fashionable “embedded, embodied cognition”, but a call for a tight
connection between one’s representations and the world. It is the informational
richness of an actual image – be it real, virtual or imagined – that performs that
intrinsic reasoning task.
Without going into details, other elements of logical reasoning, conjunctions,
disjunctions, resolution etc. can be performed by simulation theories (Uchida
et al., 2012).
It may be objected that it may be difficult to construct grounded knowl-
edge of abstract concepts, while they are seemingly easy to construct in formal
logic, e.g. loves(father, son). However, one shall not be fooled by the mean-
ing that those symbols convey to us, since they do not ground the machine
but just remind us of our own groundedness. I suspect that symbols tend to
merely seduce the researcher to look for shortcuts around the grounding prob-
lem. Conversely, even though simulation theories seem only to be describing
reasoning with visualizable, commonsense objects, one shall not underestimate
the power of analogical reasoning in the formation abstract concepts. After
all, the whole tradition of empiricist philosophy argues that the acquisition of
abstract concepts may ultimately be grounded in perception.
3.5 Universal quantification
An important problem to solve in simulation theories is universal quantification.
After checking truth values of statements for some particular simulated samples,
how can it be inferred that the same truth value will be observed for all samples
under the present conditions?
Consider a probabilistic account: what are the chances of picking a random
isosceles triangle such that the base happens to be cut exactly in the middle by
the perpendicular? Not high, and the probability will decrease even more when
measuring the cutting point with higher precision. Of course, this is not a strict
proof, but as has been argued many times, human intelligence does not have to
be perfect, but just good enough for correctly dealing with most situations in
life.
If the system maintains hypotheses about the triangle in the background of
reasoning, it can evaluate the likelihood that a particular unpredicted curiosity
of the sample could have been generated by chance. Of course, one would have
to specify what such a curiosity is and how it is to be identified. After all,
why is cutting the basis at length fraction of 0.5 (in the middle) so much more
suspicious and curiosity awakening than cutting it at 0.46878?
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Here is where compression plays a central role. Choosing a binary represen-
tation, the number 5 can be expressed by 101, whereas 46878 will be much longer
(1011011100011110). In terms of Kolmogorov complexity, the shortest program
with 0.5 as output will be much shorter than the shortest writing 0.46878.
Keep in mind that all that was used by the simulation was just the definition
of an isosceles triangle. Without proof, the fact that the base was met in the
middle is surprising since the cutting point is at a position of low complexity.
The surprise comes from the fact that a line piece can only have very few
such points of low complexity (low fractions as 1/2, 1/3, 1/4 or some other salient
numbers such as 1/pi) and hence the probability of hitting those points is very
low unless entailed by the definition of the problem in the first place.
Consider another example. Imagine a “whip”: one end of a string is tied
to an end of a rod. In what case the other end of the string could reach the
other end of the rod? Commonsense dictates that the string be at least as long
as the rod. How did we arrive at that hypothesis? Suppose, after a trial and
error phase, the system figures out that the length l of the string is important.
What condition should be imposed on it? The system could invent an array
of numbers l1, l2, l3, . . . and construct an arbitrary complex condition from it,
such as l ≤ l1 ∧ l > l2 ∧ l ≤ (l3 − l2)2/l1. However, the Occam bias dictates
parsimonious solutions. Since the length of the rod lr is already present in the
data and does not have to be invented, it is to be used preferably and in a
simple way. One of the simplest ways that is consistent with previous trial and
error data is therefore l ≥ lr. This hypothesis can be quickly tested by choosing
l = lr ±  with a small , which will drive its posterior probability close to 1.
Just as in sequence prediction, the reuse of already present variables such as
previous entries or the rod length, and doing it in a simple way maximizes the
chances of finding correct hypotheses.
Note that a hypothesis could be found for all isosceles triangles and for all
strings complying with the conditions, which establishes that simple hypotheses
are viable candidates for valid universally quantified statements. Nevertheless,
how much certainty can be gained that the statement is really universally true
and not just for the few examples?
Getting a few examples fully consistent with the simplest explanation is so
compelling in terms of posterior probability that we arrive close to certainty,
because a simple explanation is so much more probable a priori than a complex
one. However, exceptions can always occur. For example, two natural numbers
a and b picked uniformly from 1 to 1000 will be different with probability 99.9%.
For some reason, the exception, a = b is exactly the compressible case, since
then only one number has to be stored. I therefore suspect that exceptions occur
preferably at compressible instantiations of the variables, which considerably
simplifies their detection. Otherwise, if Nature wants to introduce exceptions
at incompressible locations, she has to pay for it with information. After all,
since exceptions are nothing but missing truth conditions of a statement, they
are thus biased towards simplicity as any truth condition.
We conclude that general compression with its hypothesis sequences ordered
from low to high complexity has the potential to solve the universal quantifica-
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tion problem in simulation theories, bringing us much closer to the solution of
the commonsense problem.
3.6 Testing hypotheses, intervention
Given a set of possible hypotheses, the important question about hypothesis
testing arises. As can be shown, structure learning in Bayesian networks pro-
ceeds much faster, if it is possible to intervene and observe the effects of the
intervention (Pearl, 1988). Essentially, the question is about setting up scientific
experiments. Which actions shall be chosen in order to gain most information
about the data given current hypotheses?
The solution is known as the principle of maximum entropy (MacKay, 2003).
Given a set of hypotheses and their prior probabilities coming from both previ-
ous data and the Occam bias, the probability of every result of an experiment
can be computed. The maximum entropy principle states that the action should
be chosen in such a way that the entropy of the probability distribution of the
possible results is maximal. In other words the all results should be expected
to be seen with the same probability given current hypotheses.
For example, in the previous chapter, the goal was to test whether the other
end of the rod of length lr is reachable by a string of length l. We assume that
the possibility of reaching that end is described by l ≥ l0, and some lengths l
have already been tested reducing the possible range of l0to a ≤ l0 ≤ b. The
result of the task shall be given by the variable X, with X = 1 meaning that the
task is possible. Suppose, there are two hypotheses, H1 : l0 = lr and H2 : l0 is
uniform. If H1 is true, then any string longer than the rod will lead to success,
hence the likelihood of l is p(X = 1|l,H1) = Θ(l−lr), with Θ being the Heaviside
step function. If H2 is true, then the probability of success increases linearly
between a and b, p(X = 1|l,H2) = l−ab−a . Marginalizing out the hypotheses, we
get
p(X = 1|l) = p(X = 1|l,H1)p(H1) + p(X = 1|l,H2)p(H2) =
Θ(l − lr)β + l − a
b− a (1− β) =
1
2
with β = p(H1) = 1 − p(H2) representing the bias, hence incorporating the
posterior probabilities on the hypotheses derived so far. Setting the probability
to 12 is the maximum entropy requirement, since only two results are possible.
Solving this equation for l leads to the optimal length for the test. Since the
hypotheses can been derived by the general compressor, the bias for the more
simple hypothesis H1 will be strong, β . 1, since the rod length lr is a variable
already present in the representation and no new length l0 has to be introduced.
Therefore, the discontinuity will jump over 12 and the optimal test is going
directly for the simple hypotheses: l = lr with some small  around it.
In summary, we see that optimal hypothesis tests can be computed by the
maximum entropy principle. Of course, there is no need for mathematical
derivation of the necessary distributions in practice, as we did here. Instead,
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the distributions can be bootstrapped, given our generative hypotheses, leading
to approximately optimal tests.
4 Role of compression and grounding in learning
the world’s concepts
How would all that, compression, grounding, help the system understand the
actual world with its complex concepts?
Consider static, black line drawings on a white background as an example
of environment for an AGI system. Eventually, the system shall fulfill Minsky’s
call for the ability to talk about the objects in the drawing. The scene should not
be specified in advance and could contain any everyday scene, like a landscape
with houses, cars and trees, or a room with furniture and various artifacts. How
is compression and grounding useful for reaching such a task?
4.1 Conceptualizing objects and relations through com-
pression
First, the system would notice that the n × n image contains only black and
white points, which reduces the entropy enormously to n2 bits. Further, a
good idea is to assume that all points are white with only few exceptions that
constitute the line drawing. Therefore, it is enough to store that all are white
and the positions of the black points. Each point requires the specification of
two coordinates, taking 2 log2 n bits. If the number of black points is m  n2
then the entropy reduces to 1 + 2m log2 n  n2 bits (one bit to specify the
background color). One may call this compression and representation step as
the discovery of the concept POINT. Further, if the drawing consists of straight
lines, the system should discover that as well, meaning that the coordinates of
some points can be computed from others given the slope of the line. Essentially,
the number of line end points l is much smaller than the overall number of black
points, which reduces the entropy further to 1 + 2l log2 n 1 + 2m log2 n. This
may be called as the discovery of the LINE concept. Consider, for example a
“house” drawn as a triangle on top of a square (Fig. 4.1a). It requires only 6
lines to be specified, hence l = 12. Assume n = 128 then, we get an entropy
H = 1 + 2l log2 n = 169 bits, which is quite small compared to a random bit
image with H = n2 = 16384 bits. Further, the system could discover that
those lines are connected, i.e. the line ends of some lines constitute the same
points, which make a loop. Hence, the drawing can be put together by two
closed POLYGONS. Subsequently, the system may discover that the number of
points between the corners of one of polygons is equal, which gives birth to the
rough concept of LENGTH and SQUARE. The number of corners then define
the concepts TETRAGON and TRIANGLE.
There are several lessons to learn from this procedure. First, the guiding
principle for concept generation is compression. For example, there is a cas-
cade of subsets: squares ⊂ rhombs, rectangles ⊂ parallelograms ⊂ trapezoids
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⊂ tetragons ⊂ polygons ⊂ chains of lines ⊂ set of lines ⊂ binary image. As we
have seen, every such step from general to specific constitutes not just a special
case, but a compressible special case. A square is not just some specific rectan-
gle, but a compressible one in the sense that all sides are equal and therefore
less numbers are needed to define it.
Second, each specification step is reached by imposing a constraint on the
previous one. After all, because of the recursivity of the compression algorithm,
every compression step merely compresses the remaining degrees of freedom of
the previous compression step.
Third, ambiguities are resolved by compressibility. After all, there is no
unique partition of the “house” into polygons. Nevertheless, since a square or
even rectangle is a quite special polygon the scene is preferably partitioned into
the square and the remaining isosceles triangle (see ch. 2.7 on interpretation
rivalry).
Finally, concept learning is driven not just by compression, but also by the
stimuli that occur preferably in the world. After all, from the point of view
of compressibility one could attach the “roof” just as well on the side of the
building instead of its top. Hence, the world biases concept learning towards
actually occurring cases. This becomes especially important when the number
of possible objects increases exponentially with the number of elements that an
object consists of.
Beyond the representation of objects, spatial relations can also be derived.
For example, the concept of a DISTANCE between objects could be conceptu-
alized as the length of an imagined line between them. Further, the concepts
ABOVE, BELOW, LEFT, RIGHT are low complexity conditions on the x- and
y-coordinates.
Of course, this brief discussion does not demonstrate the viability of the
approach, nor does it show that all concepts can be derived this way, including
abstract ones. However, it highlights the important role, compression might
play in the generation of concepts about the world.
4.2 Grounded knowledge bases
Despite all advantages of grounded reasoning and representations, the tight con-
nection to the present input leads to mere fleeting representations immediately
forgotten after the relevant input disappears. This begs the question about
permanent knowledge storage in a way consistent with the present ideas.
A tentative and admittedly incomplete idea is to store knowledge about
objects in the form of typical templates. A template is an image of an object that
is fully stored in the system memory. Storing complete images is necessary for
grounded reasoning since the system has to preserve the ability to reason about
imagined objects at arbitrary granularity. After all, for sufficiently complex
objects such as a Mercedes, it is doubtful that the system is or should be able to
store a complete feature basis for it. If the basis is not complete, not all details
of the object can be restored by sampling from the basis onto the mental stage.
24
Figure 4.1: A “house” (a). Special (b), typical (c), degenerate (d) and ambiguous
trapezoids (e).
Therefore, not only are those details excluded from further reasoning, but basis
transformations for resourceful thinking are impaired as well.
However, the template should not contain too much detail – it should be typ-
ical for the object. A typical template of a concept is an image of an instance of
that concept in such a way that the system’s feature extraction and reasoning
processes are able to recognize that concept as quickly and as unambiguously
as possible. For example, consider different images of a trapezoid. Fig. 4.1b
shows atypical trapezoids since all of them seem to represent more regularities
than are meant to imply. Parallelograms have parallel sides, rhombs have equal
lengths, rectangles right angles and squares both. Therefore, a typical image
of a trapezoid in Fig. 4.1c is more suitable to convey the concept. Conversely,
non-trapezoids such as general tetragons are not suitable. Moreover, the trape-
zoid should not be degenerate, e.g. when the distance between the parallel lines
is zero (Fig. 4.1d), nor should the sides cross, since this would allow the inter-
pretation of two triangles touching each other at a corner (Fig. 4.1e). Thus,
the a typical template contains exactly the right regularities and properties in
order to conclude the intended concept. In such a way, typical templates are
optimized for storing and transmitting information.
4.3 Grounded commonsense reasoning
Beyond the generation of concepts, the system has to be able to reason about
them and answer queries about them correctly. Consider again the “house”
in Fig. 4.1a. Given parametrized representations, the only information to be
provided in order to define the scene is the position and side length of square
and one point defining the roof top. This information is enough to generate
a particular “house” on the board. After all, compression means that a lot of
information is generated, “unpacked”, from a small amount of it.
Consider now the amount of queries that can be answered. What is the base
length of the “roof” triangle? Since the concepts of a square and triangle are
activated and the scene is generated, the length of the base can be read off from
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the scene. If a perpendicular is dropped from the top of the house, it lands
in the middle of the house floor? The question can be answered affirmatively
by simulating the perpendicular and measuring the position where it splits the
floor. Similarly, one can simulate and answer queries about whether diagonals
through the square cross in the middle and that they cut the right angle of the
square in half. Or that the crossing point of diagonals is exactly below the top
of the house.
It is easy to see that the number of possible queries about the image increases
very quickly with the number of involved elements. The crucial point is that
all those queries can be answered by the system without actually representing
or deducing them in any way from the knowledge base. The adage “a picture
is worth a thousand words” reflects the value of the present proposition. The
traditional way to reason about such commonsense problems is to formalize it
with logical statements and answering queries by backward chaining through the
knowledge base. Apart from the drawbacks mentioned in ch. 3.3, I conjecture
that the size of the knowledge base needed to answer all such queries in a
scene grows much faster with the complexity of the scene than the number
of parameters needed to generate the scene from compressed representations
and thereby answering all such queries as well. For example, consider spatial
relations between n objects. In principle, there can be n(n − 1) (asymmetric)
relations between them. Given a particular scene with given object positions,
the relations between them can readily be read off, as spacial relations are
grounded features of the scene. In a formal model of the scene though, either
all n(n−1) relations have to be stored in the knowledge base, or general rules of
symmetry and transitivity and the like have to be introduced (e.g. “if above(a,b)
then below(b,a)” or “if above(a,b) and above(b,c) then above(a,c)”). Things
are already bad enough since the generalizability of those rules is limited and
requires tremendous foresight by the programmer building a full mathematical
description of the world. Even if such a description can be given such as in
Winograd’s famous Blocks World (Winograd, 1971), it is far from clear that
a complete set of rules can be provided and that would be able to answer all
queries. Further, it is well known that the validity of a moderately true rule may
dissolve after a repeated application (e.g. a transitive rule along a chain) – one
of the main difficulties that limited the rise of fuzzy logic. All those problems
dissolve when reasoning is grounded since no rules need to be applied. Instead,
the relations of arbitrary objects can be extracted directly from the scene, while
the context-dependent generalizability of the observations can still be preserved
as argued in ch. 3.5.
Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to pour my ideas on artificial general intelligence and
on a path toward it into a coherent whole. There is hardly anything really new
to them, except this particular selection and the hopefully visible line of thought
shaping this selection into an engineering strategy.
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Since much is still half-baked, I would like to sketch the next steps to be
done. First, the test for partial progress described in ch. 1.2 has to be worked
out in practice, which means setting up a Turing machine and testing until
what complexity level current state of the art compression techniques are able
to stay general. For example, the celebrated Lempel-Ziv algorithm will be likely
to fail at compressing a simple non-stationary sequence. There will be some
complexity level at which all current algorithms will fail thereby setting up the
research goal.
Second, it has to be researched how features are to be found in general. The
hope is that one can start out with basic mathematical concepts (sets, functions,
numbers) that turn out to be applicable quite generally. For example, after the
first concepts such as points, lines etc. are defined, partonomies made up from
them could be constructed thereby defining more complex objects. Hence, I
suspect that the search for “concept primitives” could end with the set of simple
but general mathematical concepts.
Third, a strategy for recognizing and dealing with boundary problems has
to be worked out. For example, one may establish that adding a number to
the previous sequence entry works well, but breaks down at the very first entry,
since there is no previous one. The system has to deal with the brittleness
of its own generalizations. Interestingly, dealing with brittleness is similar to
dealing with exceptions: one has to find the truth conditions of observations.
It is always the same problem: a set of hypotheses explaining an observation
has to be set up, seeing an error due to brittleness in this case. Therefore, the
current framework shows the ability to attack the problem of brittleness.
Finally, a demonstrator shall be built that implements my most important
ideas and achieves a level of generality not encountered before.
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